The Journal of Social Encounters
Volume 3
Issue 1 Special Issue: Religion, Politics, and
Peacemaking

Article 5

2019

“The People of Aram Shall Go into Exile”: Practical and
Theological Dilemmas of Middle Eastern Churches since the
Beginning of the Syrian War
Wilbert van Saane
Haigazian University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters
Part of the Christianity Commons, History of Christianity Commons, Islamic Studies Commons, Near
and Middle Eastern Studies Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
van Saane, Wilbert (2019) "“The People of Aram Shall Go into Exile”: Practical and Theological Dilemmas
of Middle Eastern Churches since the Beginning of the Syrian War," The Journal of Social Encounters: Vol.
3: Iss. 1, 21-31.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters/vol3/iss1/5

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in The Journal of Social Encounters by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. For more
information, please contact digitalcommons@csbsju.edu.

The Journal of Social Encounters

“The People of Aram Shall Go into Exile”:
Practical and Theological Dilemmas of Middle Eastern Churches
since the Beginning of the Syrian War
Wilbert van Saane
Haigazian University
This paper discusses the way in which Christian churches in the Middle East have responded to
the Syrian War. It signals some practical and theological dilemmas that these churches have
faced since the conflict in Syria broke out. The description of these dilemmas is primarily based
on interviews with a representative sample of church leaders. Analysis of these dilemmas sheds
light on the way the churches of the Middle East have contributed to peaceful resolutions of the
Syrian conflict, or failed to do so. Before going into the practical and theological dilemmas of
the churches, the article provides a short sketch of the socio-political situation in Syria prior to
the war. It also offers a brief overview of the war and the way it has impacted the Christian
communities in the region.
Introduction
The title of this article was chosen to demonstrate that war and displacement have a long history
in the Middle East, and have always prompted theological reflection. As recent contributions of
Syrian Bible scholars demonstrate (Ghantous, 2018; Kassis, 2016), there are parallels between
the theological struggles of the writers of the Hebrew Scriptures and those of today’s Christian
communities. This is especially true for the prophetic literature in the Hebrew Bible deals which
deals with the reality of exile. The Hebrew prophets witnessed and tried to come to terms with
violence, displacement and exile in light of their faith in God. How could they reconcile the
catastrophes they experienced with their image of God as compassionate and faithful? As will be
argued, similar questions vex contemporary Christian communities of the Middle East and their
leaders.
One of the ancient prophetic books, Amos, which was written in the eighth century B.C. just
before the Assyrian invasion, contains an oracle about ancient Syria, which was then called
Aram. Amos prophesied that “the people of Aram will go into exile” (Amos 1:5). These ancient
words accurately describe the situation of numerous Syrians who have been displaced and forced
to leave their country during the past decade. As I will argue, it is especially this massive
displacement that is a source of challenges and dilemmas for the churches.
In this article, I will first give a rough sketch of the situation in Syria before the war. Next, I will
offer a brief overview of the war and its impact on the Christian communities of the region.
Against this background I will outline and analyze some practical and theological dilemmas that
the churches and especially their leaders face as a result of the war and the displacement it
caused.
Syria before the War
Syria is a relatively young nation state; it became independent in 1946 after the French Mandate,
which had begun after the 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty. Prior to the French Mandate, Syria was
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a province of the Ottoman Empire. Syria’s urban culture is characterised by commerce and
cultural refinement. The largest cities, Damascus and Aleppo, are home to ancient bazaars, fine
museums, and exquisite culinary traditions. While Syria’s countryside is rich in orchards, the
central desert harbours modest oil reserves. Some of Syria’s archaeological sites are part of
world heritage.
Before the civil war, Syrian society was characterized by ethnic and religious diversity. As
historian Philip Hitti argued in his monumental history of Syria (1957, first edition 1951), Syria
has been a bridge for transmitting cultural and religious values since antiquity. This was still the
case on the eve of the civil war. Although the majority of the population spoke Arabic, there
were substantial minorities that spoke other languages, such as Assyrian, Aramaic, Armenian,
Turkish, and Kurdish. Sunni Muslims formed the largest group (70-74%), about 13% were
Muslims of other convictions, 6-8% were Christians of various denominations, and 3 % Druze.
For the past fifty years, Syria has been ruled by the Ba’th Party, which was established in the
1940s. The Arabic word ba’th means renaissance. The founders chose this name to refer to the
renaissance of the Arabs after western imperialism. While the Ba’th Party accepted Islam as the
common and predominant culture of the region, it also advocated religious freedom and
secularism.
In 1963, the Ba’th Party seized exclusive power in Syria. The leadership of Ba’th was
predominantly drawn from the Alawi sect, which is one of Syria’s ethno-religious minorities.
During the French Protectorate over Syria, many officers had been selected from rural
backgrounds and ethnic minorities, including the Alawis, while not many had been drawn from
the Sunni majority. This had been a deliberate policy of the French governors of Syria. Since the
establishment of the Syrian nation in 1945, more Alawis had joined the army and risen to high
positions. In the 1950s, these military leaders gained the upper hand in Ba’th and marginalized
the civilian leaders of the party, including its founder Michel Aflaq. The fact that many highranking officers were Alawite and supportive of Ba’th helped the party to stage a successful coup
in 1963 (Seale, 1988). This coup ended the chaotic aftermath of the collapse of the Syrian Arab
Republic, which united Egypt and Syria politically. After an internal power struggle in the Ba’th
Party, General Hafiz al-Asad claimed the presidency in 1970. He remained Syria’s leader for
three decades. Upon his death, Hafiz’ son Bashar al-Asad succeeded him as the President of the
Syrian Arab Republic.
Both Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad ruled Syria with the help of a small group of loyal army
commanders and politicians, most of whom were drawn from the Alawi sect. They also built up
an elaborate network of secret services (mukhabarat), which instilled a culture of fear among the
population, the army and the political order. Whereas the early success of the party was partly
built on its anti-colonial agenda and partly on its influence in the military, its unrelenting
retention of power after the military coup of 1963 was largely due to Ba’th’s grip on the military
and police apparatuses.
Because of the pre-eminence of one ethno-religious group in the Ba’th regime, the power
struggle in Syria could, even before the war, easily be construed as a sectarian conflict. However,
the fact that a number of high-ranking officials in the governments of both Hafiz and Bashar al22
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Asad were Sunnis and Christians demonstrates that sectarianism was not the major concerns of
the Ba’th Party, as Van Dam (2017) points out. This is an important observation because it gives
a clue to the sources and the resolutions of the conflict.
A brief overview of the Syrian War
The Syrian War started as a popular uprising in the spring of 2011. The immediate trigger for the
protests in Syria was the torture and killing of a thirteen-year-old boy who had sprayed antigovernment graffiti on a wall in the southern town of Daraa. When protesters took to the streets
in the Syrian capital of Damascus in March 2011, they demanded reforms and the release of antiregime political prisoners. In the three months that followed, the demonstrations intensified and
spread all over Syria. The Syrian police and the army suppressed the demonstrations with
increasing violence, arresting thousands and killing many. [reference]
The revolution morphed into a civil war when, in July 2011, large numbers of servicemen
defected from the national security forces and the army and formed oppositional militias. The
most notable among these was the Free Syrian Army, which was formed on 29 July 2011. By
now, the aim of the insurgents was to overthrow President Assad and his government.
The involvement of jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) complicated and perpetuated the Syrian War. Historians agree that jihadist groups
joined the war later on and had no part in the popular uprising of the first few months. In other
words: they used the chaotic situation as an opportunity to intervene and push their own agenda –
the re-establishment of the caliphate in Iraq and Syria – thereby destabilizing the country further
(Burke, 2015).
Regional and international political dynamics were another factor in the Syrian War. A
discussion of these dynamics goes beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it here to say that
several Middle Eastern and European countries, Russia and the United States of America have
all been involved indirectly – by backing the Syrian government or opposition groups and
supplying them with weapons – or directly through military intervention. From the vantage point
of 2019, it appears that the Russian military intervention, which began in September 2015, has
decided the war in favour of the Syrian government.
In spite of international politics and the rise of jihadist groups, the Syrian War can be traced back
to internal tensions, as Van Dam (2017) argues. These internal tensions were not primarily
caused by sectarianism, but rather by what one observer calls a class conflict (Rahimah, 2016).
Large segments of society, especially among the majority Sunni population, felt disenfranchised
in Asad’s Syria. Political, military and economic power was in the hands of a relatively small
segment of the population. Dissension was not tolerated and often nipped in the bud with
repressive means. The Syrian secret services were especially feared for their shrewdness and
cruelty. These circumstances were a fertile seedbed for revolution and, eventually, armed
conflict. It should be noted that this analysis is not shared by the Syrian government and its
supporters, who have consistently justified their policies and military actions as a defence against
terrorist groups. The regime’s use of an “Islamist threat” as a legitimation for its use of violence
has been called into question by the Syrian theologian Najib Awad (2012), who argues that the
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Syrian government’s policies should not be built on fear, but on a courageous effort to bring all
segments of Syrian society together.
The humanitarian cost of the Syrian War is staggering. In April 2016, the UN special envoy to
Syria, Staffan de Mistura, estimated that 400,000 people had been killed since the beginning of
the war. Since April 2016, the death toll rose significantly, especially during the assault on
Eastern Ghouta, which took place in the winter of 2017-2018. According to UNHCR estimates
of July 2017, the war has caused the internal displacement of 7,500,000 people, while over
5,000,000 have fled the country.

The Syrian War and the Christian communities
This section provides a general sketch of the impact of the war on the churches of Syria and, by
extension, the surrounding countries. Prior to 2011, the Christian population of Syria was
estimated at 1.5 million, or 6-8% of the population (Siriani, 2018). This number has fallen
dramatically since the beginning of the war. Before offering more details, I will first shed light
on the attachment of the churches to their ancestral lands. I will focus on the Syrian Orthodox
Church, the Armenian Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Church of Syria and Lebanon,
because the interviewed leaders were from these churches.
Many Syrian churches trace their lineage back to the very first centuries of Christianity and have
had an uninterrupted presence in the land. As a result, they are not geographically limited to
Syria. This is not surprising if we keep in mind that the Syrian Republic is a relatively young
state. The attachment of these churches to their ancestral lands runs much deeper than their
attachment to the modern nation states of the Middle East. The Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate of
Antioch, which is located in Damascus, for instance, comprises not only the Syrian Orthodox
parishes in Syria, but also in Lebanon, Iraq and southeast Turkey. The Armenian Catholic
Patriarchate of Cilicia, whose headquarters are in Bzommar in Lebanon, comprises all parishes
in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The Synod of the Presbyterian Church is a gathering of all
congregations in Syria and Lebanon.
During the second decade of the twentieth century, the attachment of Syriac, Assyrian and
Armenian Christians to their ancestral lands was given a deeper dimension during the Armenian
Genocide and the Sayfo, as the mass murder of the Syriac and Assyrian Christians is called.
During these horrendous events, hundreds of thousands were killed and the Syriacs, Assyrians
and Armenians were driven away from their ancestral lands in southern Turkey.
Ninety years on, the first decade of the twenty-first century did not bode well for Middle Eastern
Christianity, for in the wake of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, thousands of
Iraqi Christians were forced to leave their country. Before the United States, the United Kingdom
and their allies intervened in Iraq in 2003, there were an estimated 700,000 Christians in Iraq.
Due to the violence in the country that followed the intervention, that number was drastically
reduced. The World Christian Database estimated the number of Christians at 336,000 in 2015
(cited in Teule, 2018). According to a report by the World Council of Churches and Norwegian
Church Aid (2016) the number of Christians in Iraq is less than 250,000.
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The beginning of the twenty-first century was, by contrast, a period of relative peace for
Christians in Syria. The Syrian Orthodox, for example, were able to build new churches, schools
and monasteries (Murre-van den Berg, 2018, Teule, 2018). Little did they expect that the same
fate awaited them that had befallen their Iraqi sisters and brothers.
The war has profoundly affected the Syrian Christian communities. The Syrian scholar Razek
Siriani (2018) gives a glimpse of the impact of the Syrian War by listing the following figures.
The Syrian Christian population has dwindled from 6-8% to about 4%. That means 700,000800,000 Christians have fled the country. He provides details of the impact of the war on the
religious institutions and leaders.
At least 82 churches have been targeted by Islamist terrorists and destroyed either
completely or partially. Six priests of different denominations were assassinated in cold
blood by terrorists during 2013 and 2015. Two bishops of Aleppo were abducted by
unknown armed insurgents in April 2013. Two priests were kidnapped by Al-Nusra Front
in October 2012 (Siriani, 108).
Siriani tells two dramatic stories of Christian communities that were forcibly removed from t heir
cities and villages. The first is the story of the 5,000 strong Christian population of Raqqa, a city
halfway Aleppo and the Iraqi borders. Raqqa was occupied by ISIS in March 2013. Christians
were given one day to choose between submitting to Shari’a law and converting to Islam or to
leave the city. Virtually all left. The second story is that of the Assyrian population of the
Hassakeh area, in the northeast of the country. Assyrian Christians were living in villages near
the Khabour River. Their community was decimated due to an invasion by ISIS in late 2015 and
early 2016. Around 210 Assyrian Christians were kidnapped , which prompted almost the entire
community to evacuate the area. Almost all hostages were released in 2016 after painstaking
negotiations and the payment of high ransoms.
Practical dilemmas of the churches
The devastations of the war have confronted the Christian churches with a number of new
practical and theological dilemmas. I will first outline the dilemmas of a more practical kind and
then move on to the deeper-lying theological dilemmas. I base this sketch on the voices of Syrian
Christian leaders. Syrian Christianity is very diverse and includes Eastern Orthodox, Oriental
Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches. In preparation for this paper, three church leaders
were interviewed: Bishop George Saliba of the Syrian-Orthodox Diocese of Mount Lebanon and
Tripoli; the Armenian Catholic Monsignor George Assadourian, who serves as Auxiliary to the
Armenian Catholic Patriarch of Cilicia; and Reverend Joseph Kassab, who is the General
Secretary of the National Evangelical Synod of Syria and Lebanon (Presbyterian). Although no
leader from the Eastern Orthodox family of churches was interviewed, these three represent
Middle Eastern Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Protestantism.
The first dilemma of the churches is related to the mass exodus of Syrian Christians. As was
noted, an estimated 700,000 Christians have left the country, which means that the Christian
population has halved since the beginning of the conflict. The interviewed church leaders
confirm this or sketch an even bleaker picture. Reverend Kassab confirmed that at least 50% of
Presbyterians have left, and said that, in some locations, it may be as high as 70%. Bishop
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Assadourian estimated that 60% of Armenian Catholics have emigrated from the country. Bishop
Saliba did not give figures, but simply stated that “the majority of our people left”.
Like other Syrian citizens, Christians have chosen to leave the country for a number of reasons.
Many of them were directly affected by the war: homes, shops and workshops were hit by
rockets; business declined; schools closed; security was no longer guaranteed; and, sadly, in
many cases members of their families were injured or killed. As a result, they concluded that
they did no longer had a future in Syria and fled to other countries.
Why do the church leaders view the departure of their members as a problem? The first and most
obvious reason is that they fear that there will no longer be church members, church leaders and
churches in Syria. Monsignor Assadourian expressed his exasperation when he said: “Everyone
is thinking about emigration! It is very difficult to find new people for the priesthood!” However,
the church leaders are concerned about more than just the perpetuation of their ecclesiastical
institutions. All three interviewed leaders expressed that they believe Syria needs its minorities.
Without the Christian minorities, post-war Syria cannot return to its multicultural identity. It can
no longer be the ethno-religious mosaic it has been for centuries. Bishop Saliba conveyed this
longing to a return to the pre-war state: “I was born in Qamishli. We used to have Jews,
Muslims, Kurds and Christians there. All lived together in harmony. In recent years, things
changed, when the terrorists came. By the good will of good people everything could be changed
for the better.” On yet another level, the church leaders fear that faith and ecclesial life will not
flourish in the diaspora as it has in Syria. In other words: Syria needs Christians, but the
Christians also need Syria. Assadourian articulated his concern about the faith of the members of
his church who have left the country. According to him, in Syria, Syrian Christians are like fish
in the water. But once they leave Syria their faith is at risk because they are no longer part of
their religious communities; they no longer speak their language; and they may not have regular
contact with a priest.
In light of this, the Syrian church leaders face a dilemma as to what to advise church members
who are considering emigration. The word of a religious leader has considerable weight in the
Middle East. Religious leaders are also involved in the practical process of emigration, because
they supply their members with necessary papers such as birth and wedding certificates. Bishop
Saliba poignantly said: “We do not wish for our people to leave to Europe. But we cannot stop
them. This is their life. People try to do the best for their families and children.”
The second practical challenge relates to the widespread destruction and the resulting poverty of
the Syrian population. Throughout Syria, homes, factories, schools and economic centres have
been damaged or destroyed. The interviewed church leaders testified to the destruction of
sanctuaries and schools. Armenian Catholic buildings in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Aleppo and Kassab
have been damaged or destroyed. Syrian Orthodox sanctuaries in Deir ez-Zor and Homs suffered
the same fate, while Syrian Orthodox schools in Deir ez-Zor, the Khabour region and Homs had
to close temporarily due to damage. The Presbyterian Church lost sanctuaries in Idlib and
Aleppo. Its school in Aleppo was temporarily occupied by militias. The churches have spent
considerable resources on the reconstruction of their properties. Some of the cost of
reconstruction has been borne by the members of the churches, while other churches, ecumenical
organizations and NGOs have also come to their aid. The upshot of the nationwide destruction is
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a sharp increase in poverty. A compounding factor is the devaluation of the Syrian currency to
one-tenth of its pre-war value. As poverty has increased, church members have not been able to
donate as much to the churches as they did before the war. Meanwhile, more people have
depended on the churches for support.
Most Syrian church leaders have become involved in the alleviation of poverty and in more
general relief work. Reverend Kassab explained that 1,500 families depend on the extensive
relief programme of the Presbyterian Church. The Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate also carries out a
sizeable relief programme.
The dilemma that church leaders faced in this respect was whether to help only members of their
own denomination or to make the funds available to a wider circle of people in need. The Syrian
Orthodox and the Presbyterian relief programmes intentionally benefit Muslims as well as
Christians. Indeed, this seems to be the trend across the spectrum of church-based relief work.
There are pragmatic reasons for this, as Kassab explained. “Our churches need to create a safety
zone. They cannot be isolationist. They need to build peace with other religious groups. Sharing
is a way of building peace. The other communities will remember this.” Saliba echoed this: “We
eat the same food. We drink the same water. We breathe the same air. What is good for them is
also good for us and vice versa.”
The relief programmes bring a third dilemma into focus that concerns the relationships with
other faith communities. What is the extent of the mission of the churches among vulnerable
people? Many Syrians are so needy that they will gladly accept food parcels, medical assistance,
hygiene products, financial aid towards education and the like from other faith communities. But
what do the churches expect from them in return? This is a dilemma that does not only occur
inside Syria, but also in the neighbouring countries, where churches and faith-based NGOs are
involved in relief work and educational projects among refugee communities. Reverend Kassab
explained that, although many Presbyterians have left Syria, church attendance has increased
since the beginning of the war. “People who have received aid have felt that, while everybody
betrayed them, this church has stood by their side. So they have come and worshipped with us.
Even some Muslims came to our churches and found comfort.” Kassab is, however, adamant that
there are no strings attached to the Presbyterian relief programme. He contrasts the
Presbyterians, who are ecumenically-minded, with other evangelical groups, who focus on
conversion and baptism. “We do not offer assistance on the condition that people come to
church. We do not push.” All three church leaders emphasized the importance of interfaith
relations. Saliba: “We do not call anybody an enemy. We call them our partners. Muslims in
Syria are our partners in the country.”
Monsignor Assadourian touched on a very sensitive point in the relation with other faith
communities. Should Christians take up arms in order to defend themselves? He explained that,
initially, the Armenian Catholics refused to carry arms, but that the attacks of jihadist groups
forced them to use weapons in self-defence. In both Iraq and Syria, Christian communities have
formed militias to protect their neighbourhood and villages against jihadist groups.
Theological dilemmas
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By and large, Syrian Christians have consistently supported the government. That is not to say
that there have been no Christian voices in support of the opposition. Nor is it accurate to claim
that Christians have not shared the concern for political and social reform. However, the majority
of Syria’s Christians has taken the view that the removal of the Assad-regime would be much
costlier than its preservation. This view is based on the conviction that the regime will safeguard
the security and the rights of religious minorities better than any opposition group.
This ambivalence towards both government and opposition immediately brings a politicaltheological dilemma of Syrian Christians into focus. While they are supportive of the regime and
while they dismiss the available political alternatives, to what extent can they voice constructive
criticism? Bishop Saliba repeatedly stated that the Syrian Orthodox are loyal supporters of the
regime: “We are Christians. We worship God. We respect the king, the president, or whoever is
responsible. And we love others. This is the teaching of our gospel and our church.” Reverend
Kassab admitted the country’s shortcomings as far as democratic structures is concerned, but
also expressed that, during a certain period of the war, Christians feared the alternative, which
was the rise of an Islamic State in Syria, in which “not one Christian would be ready to live”.
At several stages of the war, Christian groups and churches have released statements in which
they commented on the political situation. These statements have generally expressed support for
the government. Even though a group of Jesuit priests from Aleppo released a call for political
reforms by peaceful means early on in the war (June 2011), the churches have since produced
several statements that have condemned the uprising and international interference in the Syrian
conflict. It is notable that these statements have questioned neither the policies of the Syrian
government nor Russian military interference. According to the analysis of the Lebanese
Protestant theologian Johnny Awwad (2018), the statements of the churches include some
notions from liberation theology and anti-colonial rhetoric. Awwad also notes that the statements
are “rather thin” when it comes to their theological content.
In a recent essay, Danish scholar Andreas Bandak (2015) has analysed the inability of Syrian
Christians to respond to the crisis in a more critical way in terms of fear, more precisely the fear
of extinction. Bandak compares the response of Syrian Christians to that of the Copts in Egypt
and argues that it is a deep-seated fear that translated into the Syrian Christians’ support for the
regime and precluded more nuanced responses on their part. He points out that the Christians
have perceived the uprising as a serious existential threat. Bandak’s views accord with the theory
of Jonathan Fox (1999), who contends that religions will be quietist and only support political
protest and violent opposition to a regime in case of a perceived threat to their existence.
The Syrian Christians’ fear of extinction is closely related to a deep attachment to the land. It is,
in other words, a fear of permanent exile from Syria. The current exile of Christians has shaken
the churches to the core and poses the pertinent question whether Syria as a territory is essential
to these faith communities. Should they hold on to the ancestral lands with religious zeal or do
they view the faith community as mobile and flexible, having a new future in other lands?
This dilemma is especially pressing for the Syrian Orthodox Church, whose very name testifies
to its indissoluble attachment to the land. “Syria is our motherland,” proclaimed Bishop Saliba. It
is almost impossible to imagine the Syrian Orthodox Church without a significant presence in
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Syria. Yet Bishop Saliba was pragmatic and understanding when it came to individuals and
families who wished to leave the country.
Monsignor Assadourian also expressed a deep connection to the land and made a strong
reference to the ancient presence of Christians in Syria, which predates the presence of Muslims.
“We want to be a witness to the whole world that we are Christians and that the land is ours. The
land is ours; the others are outsiders or foreigners, be they Kurds or Arabs!” As was argued
above, Assadourian fears the loss of faith and identity, when members of his church move to
western countries and feels that this identity is safeguarded in the Middle East.
The anxiety about the disappearance of the churches from the land is about more than just
keeping specific denominations alive within the current Syrian Republic; it is about more than
just safeguarding the faith of their members. It is about something that concerns the church
universal. Middle Eastern Christians perceive a risk that Christianity will be cut off from its
historic origins and become a wanderer on earth. The connection with the Holy Land and Syria
as “the cradle of Christianity” (Mikhael, 2015) is, in their view, essential. This connection
appears to be especially important for churches that interpret apostolic succession as a historical
chain.
Protestant churches care less about this historical-geographical rootedness of Christianity.
Reverend Kassab said this explicitly: “We want to be the church for Muslims. What other
interpretation can we give to the church of the Middle East? This may be the cradle of
Christianity and the Holy Land? So what? If you are not the church for the present society, what
kind of church are you?”
This takes us, finally, into the deep theological dilemma – or paradox – of God’s presence amidst
human suffering. It is here that the dilemmas bear a close resemblance with those of the ancient
Hebrew prophets who witnessed the exile to Assyria and Babylon. Where is God in this crisis?
Can we continue claiming that God is compassionate and faithful? “How can we sing the songs
of the LORD while in a foreign land?” (Psalm 137:4) That is the deepest dilemma of exile.
The answers of the church leaders reflect theological diversity. Monsignor Assadourian
counselled submission to the will of God as the way towards an as yet incomprehensible future.
He almost sounded like Job from the Bible as he says: “I am Armenian. We have always been
persecuted and killed by others. But we always resurrect. God is the one who gives life and who
takes it away. We will always glorify God’s will.” For Assadourian, God is present in suffering
and pain as well as in prosperity and joy.
Reverend Kassab emphatically defended a different view. He explained that the young people of
his denomination are demanding answers. “The church cannot say: we do not know the wisdom
of God behind all this. There is no wisdom of God here! Only Satan is at work here! God is at
work fighting this evil somewhere else. Traditional theologies ascribe this to God, stressing that
God is omnipotent. But we need other answers.”
Closely related to the question of the divine presence in crisis is the question whether security is
a sign of God’s favour and blessing. Bishop Saliba appeared to answer this question
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affirmatively. He testified: “I myself passed through many dangers. God kept me until now.”
Assadourian, on the other hand, spoke of suffering in connection with the acceptance of the will
of God. Reverend Kassab was ambivalent: while he refused to attribute the crisis in any way to
the divine will or power, he also stressed that it is important to remind the Syrian Christians of
the cross of Christ.
Conclusion
“The people of Aram shall go into exile,” prophesied Amos in the eighth century BC. Today the
pervasive reality of exile is confronting the churches of the Middle East with both practical and
theological dilemmas. They continue to grapple with these dilemmas of emigration and
connection to the land; of care for the needy and the preservation of their communities; of a
constructive role in society and a belief in God’s providence. The church leaders believe that the
continuing presence of Christian communities in Syria is essential for a just and peaceful
coexistence in the country. They also regard the presence of Syrian Christian churches in their
homeland as an essential contribution to world Christianity. That is why the threat of a
permanent exile of Christians from Syria causes such anxiety among their leaders. This
existential threat explains why the majority of Syrian Christians have chosen a pro-government
stance. However, while their political stance has often not been nuanced, Christian relief efforts
have benefited all, regardless of political, ethnic, and religious affiliations. In their selfless
actions, Christians have contributed to healing and peace in Syrian society. There are, thankfully,
signs of hope for the Christian community in Syria. Churches are being reconstructed. Weddings
are celebrated again. Slowly the country’s economic, social and political structures will have to
be rebuilt. The Christian community – now smaller than before the war – will have an important
role to play in that process.
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